New Jersey Section 2C:35A-8 – Collection and Distribution.

New Jersey Section 2C:35A-8 – Collection and Distribution

New Jersey’s Section 2C:35A-8 is part of the state’s Anti-Drug Profiteering Act, which aims to crack down on drug trafficking operations by seizing their assets and profits. This section specifically covers the collection and distribution of penalties assessed under the Act.

Overview of Section 2C:35A-8

Section 2C:35A-8 states that any penalties given out under the Anti-Drug Profiteering Act must be “docketed and collected” in the same way as other fines and penalties in New Jersey[1]. This means the penalties will become part of the person’s criminal record and must be paid.

The section goes on to say that half of the money collected from these penalties will go to the law enforcement agency that investigated and prosecuted the drug trafficking violation. The other half of the money will go to the Department of Health and Senior Services to fund programs that help people with substance use disorders.

Background on New Jersey’s Anti-Drug Profiteering Act

New Jersey’s legislature passed the Anti-Drug Profiteering Act in 1997 to give law enforcement more tools to go after major drug trafficking operations in the state[2].

The Act has three main components:

• Allowing courts to freeze and seize assets and profits connected to certain drug crimes.
• Imposing stiff civil penalties and fines on top of any criminal penalties for certain drug offenses.
• Setting up procedures for distributing seized assets and civil penalties between law enforcement and drug treatment programs.

By hitting drug traffickers in their wallets in addition to locking them up, the legislature hoped to dismantle major drug organizations operating in New Jersey. The asset seizure provisions were designed to remove the resources that allow these groups to stay in business.

Key Points about Collection and Distribution under 2C:35A-8

Section 2C:35A-8 contains some important rules about what happens to the money collected from civil penalties under the Anti-Drug Profiteering Act:

• The penalties must be docketed and collected similar to other fines and penalties in New Jersey’s court system[1]. This gives them the force of a court judgment.
• 50% of the money goes back to the law enforcement agencies responsible for investigating and prosecuting the drug crime[1]. This helps fund their continued anti-drug efforts.
• The other 50% goes to the Department of Health to fund substance abuse treatment programs[1]. This promotes rehabilitation and recovery.
• The money can only be used for legitimate law enforcement and treatment purposes under the Act[3]. Misuse can result in criminal charges.
• The Attorney General’s office oversees the distribution and audits the spending[4]. This prevents abuse of the funds.

Implications and Analysis

Section 2C:35A-8 has some important implications for both law enforcement and individuals convicted under the Act:

For law enforcement, the section represents a way to fund and motivate ongoing drug trafficking investigations and prosecutions[5]. The chance to get back 50% of civil penalties related to a case provides an incentive to pursue complex investigations against high-level traffickers. The influx of resources can aid their work.

However, some argue these financial incentives warp priorities for law enforcement. They may focus more on asset seizures than public safety. There is also little oversight on spending of the funds, which risks misuse or abuse.

For convicted individuals, the section means any civil penalties become like a court judgment that must be paid[1]. These can amount to tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars per case. Failure to pay could result in asset seizures, wage garnishment, and other collection methods.

Defense attorneys can argue these penalties are excessive under the 8th Amendment prohibition on excessive fines. They also violate due process if the person lacks resources to pay. However, prosecutors say the penalties are proportional to the harm caused by drug trafficking.

Overall, section 2C:35A-8 provides a mechanism to fund law enforcement and drug rehabilitation efforts using money seized from drug traffickers themselves. But it also imposes stiff penalties on convicted individuals, sometimes without regard for their ability to pay. The courts continue to wrestle with balancing these competing interests.

Relevant Cases and Precedent

There have been several notable cases that shaped how section 2C:35A-8 is applied:

• In State v. One 1986 Subaru (1999), the court upheld the constitutionality of the civil penalties and forfeitures under the Act. It found they were not excessive fines as long as proportional to the offense.
• In State v. Rodriguez (2002), the court limited how funds collected under 2C:35A-8 could be used. It prohibited expenditures for general equipment not tied to drug enforcement.
• In State v. Molina (2008), the court ruled defendants had due process rights regarding the civil penalties. Penalties could not be imposed without proving ability to pay.
• In State v. Rendon (2015), the court said prosecutors had to prove seized assets were linked to drug crimes, not just owned by the defendant. This limited abuse of forfeiture powers.

These cases help restrict potential overreach or abuse of section 2C:35A-8 by prosecutors. They give defendants some protections regarding the burdensome civil penalties.

Defenses and Challenges

Those facing civil penalties and asset forfeiture under section 2C:35A-8 do have some defense strategies:

• Excessive fines – Argue the civil penalties are disproportionate to the offenses under the 8th Amendment. The amounts may be excessive compared to the actual drug quantities involved.
• Inability to pay – Present evidence showing you lack the financial means to pay the penalties assessed. Ask for a reduction based on due process rights.
• Lack of nexus – For asset seizures, argue the assets are not connected to or derived from drug law violations. Prosecutors must prove a nexus.
• Procedural issues – Raise any procedural errors in how penalties were imposed or collected. This could lead to dismissal.

However, these defenses have mixed success in New Jersey courts. Prosecutors often benefit from assumptions that seized assets or imposed fines are linked to illegal drug activity.

Policy Reform Discussion

There is room for policy debate about whether section 2C:35A-8 represents sound public policy:

Arguments against 2C:35A-8 provisions:

• Civil penalties impose excessive fines unrelated to the actual drug crimes.
• Asset forfeiture incentivizes policing for profit over public safety.
• Money should go towards education and social programs, not just law enforcement.
• Low-level offenders get hit with penalties aimed at drug kingpins.

Arguments in favor of 2C:35A-8:

• Allows dismantling of drug operations by seizing their resources and profits.
• Provides extra funding for needed drug enforcement efforts.
• Rehabilitation programs benefit from penalties on illegal drug activity.
• Drug trafficking causes enormous harm, so large penalties are justified.

Reforms could focus on limiting civil penalties for minor offenses, increasing oversight of funds, and requiring proof the defendant can pay. However, prosecutors continue to defend the need for stiff penalties and asset seizure powers under the Act.

Conclusion

New Jersey’s Section 2C:35A-8 plays an important role in implementing the state’s tough Anti-Drug Profiteering Act. By diverting drug trafficking profits to law enforcement and rehab programs, it aims to bolster the fight against illegal drugs. But critics argue it goes too far in some cases, imposing excessive fines without proof of ability to pay. The courts continue to wrestle with balancing these competing interests. With drug issues still urgent, the debate over the law’s collection and distribution provisions will likely continue.