Why MCA Funders Agree to Settle for Less Than You Owe
The funder is not being generous. The funder is being rational. Settlement for less than the full balance is a business decision driven by the funder’s calculation of expected recovery, cost of enforcement, and risk of an adverse legal outcome.
Business owners in MCA disputes often assume the funder holds all the leverage and will never accept less than the full amount. This assumption misunderstands the funder’s position. The funder is not a moralistic actor seeking full repayment as a matter of principle. The funder is a financial institution seeking to maximize net recovery on a receivable. When accepting a reduced amount today produces a higher net recovery than pursuing the full amount through enforcement, the funder accepts the reduced amount. That is not concession. It is optimization.
The Cost of Enforcement
Pursuing the full balance requires legal action. Legal action costs money. Attorney fees for MCA litigation range from thousands to tens of thousands of dollars depending on the complexity and duration of the case. If the case goes to trial or arbitration, the costs increase further. If the case is in the borrower’s home state rather than the funder’s preferred forum, travel and local counsel costs add up.
Every dollar spent on enforcement is a dollar subtracted from the recovery. A funder that spends $25,000 in legal fees to collect $75,000 has a net recovery of $50,000. A settlement of $55,000 today, with no legal fees, produces a higher net recovery. The math favors settlement.
The Risk of an Adverse Outcome
Litigation is uncertain. If the borrower raises a credible usury defense and the court recharacterizes the MCA as a loan, the funder may recover nothing — the agreement is void and the funder forfeits the entire obligation. If the borrower raises a consumer fraud claim with treble damages, the funder may end up owing money to the borrower rather than collecting from the borrower.
The funder’s internal risk assessment weighs the probability of these outcomes against the cost of settlement. A 30% chance of a zero-recovery outcome makes a 40-cent settlement very attractive. A 50% chance of a treble-damages counterclaim makes any settlement that avoids the counterclaim attractive. The funder does not need to believe the borrower will win. The funder needs to believe the borrower might win. Uncertainty is the borrower’s leverage.
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(212) 300-5196The Time Value of Money
Litigation takes time. A contested MCA case may take six months to two years to resolve through litigation or arbitration. During that time, the receivable is aging on the funder’s books. The funder has capital tied up in the dispute that could be deployed elsewhere. The present value of $60,000 received today is higher than the present value of $100,000 received in eighteen months, especially when the $100,000 is uncertain and subject to legal fees. Funders, like all financial institutions, prefer certain cash today over uncertain cash tomorrow.
Portfolio Management
MCA funders manage portfolios of receivables. Each receivable is categorized by age, collectibility, legal status, and expected recovery. Receivables in default are impaired assets. Receivables subject to legal challenge are further impaired. The funder’s portfolio managers have internal targets for resolving impaired receivables, and settlements — even at steep discounts — allow the funder to clear the receivable from the books, recognize the recovery, and redeploy the capital.
The funder’s willingness to settle is not personal. It is structural. The incentives built into the funder’s business model — cost of enforcement, risk of adverse outcomes, time value of money, portfolio management pressures — all point toward settlement as the rational outcome in a significant percentage of disputes. The business owner who understands these incentives negotiates from a position of informed leverage rather than uninformed weakness.
Todd Spodek
Lead Attorney & Founder
Featured on Netflix's "Inventing Anna," Todd Spodek brings decades of high-stakes criminal defense experience. His aggressive approach has secured dismissals and acquittals in cases others deemed unwinnable.
What Creates Settlement Leverage for You
Your leverage is a function of what happens if the negotiation fails. If the funder’s alternative to settlement is expensive litigation against a represented borrower with credible usury and fraud claims in the borrower’s home jurisdiction, your leverage is substantial. If the funder’s alternative is an easy enforcement action against an unrepresented debtor with an enforceable agreement, your leverage is minimal. The gap between these two scenarios is the gap between a 25% settlement and an 80% settlement. The variable is not the funder’s generosity. The variable is the funder’s risk.
There is one additional factor that business owners frequently overlook: the funder’s internal accounting treatment of the receivable. MCA receivables that have been in default for an extended period are typically written down or reserved against on the funder’s books. A receivable that has been internally valued at 30 cents on the dollar can be settled at 35 cents and booked as a gain. The funder’s willingness to accept a steep discount may reflect not generosity or weakness but an internal valuation that already anticipates the discount. The settlement that feels like a win for the borrower may also be a win for the funder’s accounting department.
Understanding these structural incentives transforms the borrower’s approach to negotiation. The borrower is not asking for mercy. The borrower is presenting a resolution that aligns with the funder’s rational self-interest. The most effective negotiation strategy is one that makes settlement the funder’s best available option — not through pleading, but through the credible demonstration that the alternatives to settlement are worse for the funder than settlement itself.