The second advance was supposed to stabilize the first. It did the opposite, and it did so by design.
The second MCA entered your financial structure at a moment of vulnerability. The first advance was consuming more cash flow than anticipated. Revenue had declined, or the factor rate was higher than the broker described, or the daily withdrawal simply proved unsustainable against the realities of operating the business. The second advance addressed the symptom (insufficient cash) without addressing the cause (an obligation that exceeded capacity). And it added a second daily withdrawal to an account that was already failing to support the first.
The Second Factor Rate Was Higher
The second funder priced the advance for a borrower carrying existing MCA debt, which is a borrower at elevated risk. The factor rate on the second advance was higher than the first, reflecting that risk. If the first advance carried a 1.35 factor rate and the second carried a 1.45, the cost of capital increased by approximately seven percentage points on the new principal. The total repayment obligation grew faster than the available revenue.
The Combined Daily Withdrawal Exceeded the Sustainable Threshold
A single MCA withdrawal at twelve percent of daily revenue is manageable. Two withdrawals totaling twenty-two percent are not. The threshold between manageable and unsustainable is not theoretical. It is the point at which the business can no longer pay operating expenses after the withdrawals clear.
You crossed that threshold the day the second advance funded. The business has been operating in deficit since.
The Second Advance Paid Off Part of the First
In many cases, a portion of the second advance was used to satisfy the remaining balance on the first (or to bring the first current after missed payments). This means you received less usable capital than the face amount of the second advance, while incurring the full factor-rate obligation on the entire amount.